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Over the last five years, average GDP growth has been 1.3% in the euro area, against 2.3% in 
the UK and 2.6% in the US. It is widely recognised that the growth performance of the euro 
area cannot be deemed satisfactory and that continuation of current trends could undermine 
public confidence in the single currency.  
The most commonly held view ascribes mediocre growth to incomplete economic reforms in 
member states, especially France, Germany and Italy. According to this view, low growth 
does not result from problems in the economic governance of the euro area, but from policy 
failures in its largest member states. The response must therefore come from domestic 
reforms rather than from new common initiatives. According to this view, potential changes 
in the governance of the euro area – that is, in the principles, rules and institutions that 
constitute the framework of macroeconomic policy – are, at best, of second-order importance. 
Even sensible ones could be counterproductive, because they would divert attention from 
required focus on national reforms. At the extreme, temporary disaffection towards the EU 
might be a blessing in disguise if it leads to concentrate political energy on urgent domestic 
priorities. 
The primacy of domestic reforms is undisputable. A reallocation of public spending towards 
education and research, as well as regulatory reforms of labour, product, and financial 
markets, are essential prerequisites to increasing productivity and thereby the growth potential 
of the euro area. However, from that observation it does not follow that the economic 
governance of the euro area does not matter. There are three reasons why it should not be 
overlooked: 
1.  There is a less clear-cut disconnection between long-term growth and short-term 
stabilisation than generally assumed. Recent research suggests that the quality of 
contra-cyclical macroeconomic policies has an impact on long-term growth, at least as 
long as financial markets do not provide full insurance against cyclical fluctuations to 
private agents. This is because in an economy subject to fluctuations and equipped 
with less-than-complete financial markets, companies confronted with the perspective 
of liquidity constraints during downturns may refrain from undertaking risky projects 
– thereby lowering growth potential. From this perspective, budgetary and monetary 
policies may have a bearing on long-term growth. This leads to question the non-
activist character of monetary and fiscal policies (Figure 1) and especially the pro-
cyclical behaviour of aggregate budgetary policy (Figure 2) that have characterised the 
early years of EMU. 
2.  Both budgetary and monetary policies affect incentives to reform. Structural reforms 
typically involve trading off (economic and political) short-term costs for long-term 
economic gains. Therefore, political considerations may lead governments to postpone 
them, unless a crisis, or the threat of it, forces them to take action, or unless they can   2
alleviate the short-term costs through macroeconomic support. However, monetary 
union has had the twin effects of removing the threat of exchange crises and of 
limiting the potential for macroeconomic support (because monetary policy cannot 
react to policies undertaken in a single country whilst the Stability and Growth Pact 
restrains the extent of budgetary support). In a way, an environment with neither sticks 
nor carrots has contributed to creating a ‘reform trap’. This is especially worrying, as 
lack of reform in a member country reduces the overall potential for non-inflationary 
growth and thereby affects the policy of the European Central Bank.  
3.  Persistent inflation divergence within the euro area may lead to situations where real 
exchange rate misalignments represent a drag on overall growth. A situation where 
some countries within it suffer from overvaluation while others suffer from 
undervaluation, constrains the ability for the ECB to conduct a policy which is 
appropriate for the area as a whole and may lead to limiting actual growth to a below-
potential path. Certainly not all discrepancies in price developments are reasons for 
worries. However, there is evidence that for some countries in the euro area such as 
Portugal and Italy, price developments since 1999 have not been in line with 
fundamentals. In this respect, the governance of the euro area matters because 
effective multilateral surveillance can help in detecting and correcting potentially 
detrimental divergence before imbalances develop.                 
How does the euro area economic governance regime measure up to those requirements? Its 
essential tenet is that each policy instrument is assigned a specific responsibility: price 
stability for monetary policy; public finance sustainability for budgetary policy; and long term 
growth for national reforms. This specialisation principle has considerable advantages, 
especially in a multi-player setting. However, it involves the risk of neglecting 
interdependence between policy areas or between countries. The above considerations 
therefore call for several improvements.  
1.  A major priority is to correct the pro-cyclical bias of national fiscal policies while 
ensuring the sustainability of public finances. A cyclically neutral or even contra-
cyclical budgetary behaviour would contribute to smoothing out fluctuations and 
possibly to improving the long-term growth potential. The primary responsibility for 
this change rests with member states and their national parliaments, and to this end, 
possible improvements in the domestic governance of budgetary policy should be a 
matter for national discussion. Avenues for reform have been proposed, such as the 
reliance on independent economic forecasts for projections underlying the budget or 
the creation of national fiscal councils that would not have a decision role, but would 
provide independent assessments of both the aggregate budgetary situation and 
individual policy choices. They deserve thorough examination.      
2.  As regards fiscal policy, the role of the EU is limited to managing the incentives – 
both sticks and carrots. The first version of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
excessively relied on fixed rules and the threat of quasi-automatic sanctions. It has not 
passed the test of time. The reformed Pact is much more ambitious in its scope, and 
rightly so: it puts more emphasis on prevention (and therefore on the avoidance of pro-
cyclical fiscal expansion in good times); gives more weight to debt sustainability 
issues (and therefore on the crucial intertemporal dimension of fiscal policy); and 
takes into account factors underlying a deficit (such as reforms that can contribute to 
improving public finances in the long term, but involve a cost in the short term). But it 
can only succeed if accompanied by a significant enhancement in governance. The 
reason is that with this reform, the EU has moved away from a policy philosophy that 
rests on the virtue of fixed rules and embraced a decision model that rests on economic   3
judgement. However, economic judgement can easily be a pretext for purely political 
compromises. For this not to happen, decision does not only need to be based on 
explicitly stated principles. It must also be supported by reliable and independent 
expertise – which gives a major role to the Commission; and achieve consistency over 
time and across countries – which emphasises the importance of the fixed presidency 
of the Eurogroup. All in all, neither the significance of the reform of the SGP nor the 
governance challenges involved in its implementation should be underestimated. 
3.  The issue of structural reform, and the incentives for it, should take centre stage in the 
discussions on economic policies in the euro area. Paradoxically, reform coordination 
takes place at the EU level through the Lisbon process, although the effects of national 
reforms frequently have a limited impact on the EU as a whole. Reform 
interdependence within the euro area is significantly stronger, but this does not 
translate into effective policy processes. What is required first and foremost is 
recognition of this interdependence through a greater common ownership of reform 
programmes in the euro area. This could call for extending the practice of holding 
meetings of the Finance ministers of the euro area, including, if well prepared, at the 
European council level. In addition to this institutional dimension, incentives to reform 
should be enhanced in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, through 
the recognition that ambitious reform programmes that have the potential of improving 
growth and public finance sustainability may justify conditional budgetary support.     
4.  Beyond the mere implementation of the Pact, multilateral surveillance is bound to 
become increasingly important in the euro area. In the early years, emerging 
divergences could be regarded as a minor concern as they could be expected to be self-
correcting. The lessons from experience are that this is frequently not the case. 
Unfortunately, surveillance cannot rely on strong legal instruments and basically relies 
on peer pressure. This does not mean that corresponding recommendations should be 
taken lightly. The European parliament and national parliament could have a role in 
giving this discussion the weight it deserves.    
5.  Beyond the preservation of price stability, monetary policy can contribute to 
enhancing growth in two ways. First, the main responsibility for stabilising euro-area 
wide fluctuations belongs to the European Central Bank. The ECB has consistently 
refrained from activism because it considers it a potential threat to stability. A more 
reactive stance could, however, help convince economic agents that negative shocks to 
the growth of the euro area will be effectively countered as long as this does not 
conflict with the goal of price stability. Second, the ECB should explicitly let it be 
known that provided there is a common political commitment to reform and without 
prejudice to price stability, it stands ready to back policies that lower structural 
unemployment and put the euro area on a higher growth path. It has already 
recognised the existence of complementarities between macroeconomic policies and 
structural reforms and hinted at the additional room to manoeuvre that the latter would 
create for the single monetary policy. The time has come to go further and to 
unequivocally recognise that provided the governments act, monetary policy would be 
able to support their action. Such a commitment would certainly involve taking a risk. 
The question, however, is whether it is preferable to take the alternative risk of 
remaining in a deadlock that would ultimately undermine the sustainability of 
monetary union.    
This note partially draws on joint research with Philippe Aghion and Elie Cohen (2006); with 
Benoît Coeuré (2006); and within the Sapir Group (2004).   4
 
Figure 1: A representation of the policy mix in four economies 
 
Graphique 5: Orientation du policy mix, 1999-2004
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Source : Aghion, Cohen et Pisani-Ferry (2006) 
 
  Figure 2: The fiscal stance of the Eurozone
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